The principles of analytical functionalism have worked well in attempting to align the philosophies of behaviorism and identity theory, and although there are many objections to the theory's method of formally defining states mental, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory that describes the mind. I find that in determining a means by which to define mental states, analytic functionalism demonstrates an ontological method in which one can characterize the mind using statements that can withstand greater rigor than “folk psychology” alone. I will support this argument by first describing the progression towards functionalism and the specifics behind analytical functionalism. I will then describe some of the main objections to functionalism, including Ned Block's “Chinese Brain Nation” argument, John Searle's “Chinese Room” argument, and those that address the question of whether or not analytic functionalism falls within the the scope of ontology. Beyond these arguments, I will provide my own counterexamples to these claims and provide reasons for the reasonable credibility of analytic functionalism as a proper philosophy of mind. In developing the philosophy of mind, many had come to rely on Descartes and his Meditations on First Philosophy. . Dualism and the understanding of the causal relationship between the mental realm and the physical world had become widely accepted. However, doubts had begun to arise when considerations of the exclusivity of a person's mental realm were questioned. With developments in the field of psychology in the late 19th century, Sigmund Freud had theorized the idea that the mind is not always aware of its own mental state and that humans tend to ignore or deny the underlying thoughts that occur under t. ..... half of the article ...... leaves analytical functionalism as a permanent theory. Following this discussion, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory of mind because of its function as an ontological method for describing the characteristics and presence of mental states. Works Cited Block, Ned. (1978). Problems with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science 9: 261-325. Searle, John. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-457 Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). “The myth of Descartes”, chapter 1, The concept of mind, pp. 11-24Smart, J. J. C. (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review, 68, pp. 141-156. Putnam, Hilary. (1967). The nature of mental states. WH Capitan and DD Merrill (eds.), Art, mind and religion. Pittsburgh University Press.Nagel, Thomas. (1974). The Philosophical Journal LXXXIII, 4, pp.435-50.