Conventional vs. Irregular Warfare: Is the MAGTF the Model to Answer Both? When asked to compare and contrast U.S. military operations and capabilities for conventional and irregular warfare, the Marine Corps' Marine Land-Based Air Task Force (MAGTF) ​​cannot be overlooked. The MAGTF represents Marine Corps force protection aboard and how it contributes to the national security of this great nation. Five unique competencies enable the Marine Corps to do this successfully; however, they all focus on conventional warfare, with the exception of one, primarily, on the culture of war and dynamic decision making. Well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority. Conventional Warfare versus Irregular Warfare Irregular warfare is not a new tactic and has been mentioned by some of the great strategists, such as, Jomini and Clausewitz. Titles may have evolved from guerrilla, to rebel, to terrorist, to simple unconventional forces phase; however, they are all representative of violence used to counter a nation-state's conventional military forces. Conventional or traditional warfare is “fought by forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a similar and equal enemy.” Conventional warfare, in its purest form, is a “violent struggle for dominance between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states.” Irregular warfare supports indirect and asymmetric approaches and “refers to all unconventional methods of violence used to counter the traditional capabilities of a nation-state's military forces; and undermine the authority of a local government or… middle of paper… the most challenging threat to U.S. national objectives. Conclusion For the US Army, well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority in preparing for future military operations. For the U.S. Marine Corps, that means fine-tuning the MAGTF for conventional operations. As the great strategist Jomini points out, comparing the equipment of the forces and the success on the battlefield of regular forces and irregular forces, “experience has shown that irregular charges can cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it also demonstrated that they cannot be relied on in regular battles on which the fate of a war may depend... it is always better to give the cavalry a regular organization.”