When certificates become old, obsolete, or compromised, the web certificate can be revoked. Certificate revocation gives Internet companies the ability to notify users who have changed their security certificates. This research will introduce the inherent problem of an outdated certificate revocation system. This research will follow the mixed methods approach and consult many different types of research papers, tests, and discussions. This research will also document the knowledge level of IT personnel in understanding certificate revocation. Some of the findings that emerged during the initial research into certificate revocation highlighted that there are better ways to use certificate revocation and that many browser companies have not made progress with browser security. Some of the changes include enabling hard certificate revocation or soft fail (which means that if the certificate is valid or if the certificate verification connection times out, they will both be treated the same). Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) staple and OSCP must staple. These findings helped promote the idea that browser companies didn't care about certificate revocation, until the deadly vulnerability triggered a tsunami of certificate revocations. Providing privacy and security to browser users is important, providing tools by default within the browser only makes the Internet safer and the user more protected. Introduction Certificate revocation in modern browsers has proven over the last couple of weeks to be a major problem. The problem is not the certificate revocation system; the problem affects users' browsers and the default settings installed on these modern browsers. A better revocation and check-in system...... middle of paper......29/ocsp-stapling-in-firefox/Pettersen, Y. (2013). The Transport Layer Security (TLS) multiple certificate status request extension. RFC 6961. Retrieved from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6961.txtSullivan, N. (2014, April 17). The Heartbleed Aftermath: All CloudFlare Certificates Revoked and Reissued.CloudFlare Blog RSS. Retrieved April 27, 2014, from http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-heartbleed-aftermath-all-cloudflare-certificates-revoked-and-reissuedVacca, J.R. (2004). Public Key Infrastructure: Building Trusted Applications and Web Services. Boca Raton, Florida: Auerbach Publications. Websense Security Labs blog. “Digging into Certificate Revocation Lists.” Digging into certificate revocation lists. NP, 10 July 2013. Web. 25 April. 2014. .