The interrelationships between social segregation and inequality have been widely studied by several authors (Fernández and Rogerson, 1996 and 1997; Bénabou 1996a and 1996b; Gravel and Thoron, 2007; Durlauf, 1996) . However, most of these studies have focused on demonstrating the possibility of a segregated equilibrium. The latter is understood as the formation of consecutive clubs, ordered according to a variable representing the social position of the economic agents. In most studies, this variable is the person's wealth or human capital. The problem with this type of model is that it does not study the effect of income distribution on the degree of segregation. As a result, they cannot answer questions such as the following: Does the size of coalitions decrease with the degree of wealth inequality? In a society, is the size of coalitions formed by rich agents larger than the coalition of poor ones? This is a major weakness of this type of literature. Indeed, collective interrelation within coalitions can determine the accumulation of social capital and human capital, and both are known to be essential factors in economic development (Benabou, 1996a; Glomm y Ravikumar, 1992; Fernández y Rogerson , 1996). ; Durlauf, 1996) Some authors such as Bénabou (1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) compare the economic and distributional results of integrated societies with segregated ones. This type of analysis is relevant to analyzing issues such as the benefits and costs of public versus private education. However, it is not very useful in analyzing other issues such as the determinants and consequences of social segregation. In this article we study t...... half of the article ......artition.Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997 and 2001) characterize the equilibrium of free mobility. However, they do not introduce heterogeneity in the distribution of wealth and assume a very unrealistic (linear) utility function. Furthermore, the distribution of agent characteristics is very narrow (uniform). Finally, the comparative static exercises necessary to understand the relationship between the heterogeneity of the agents and the degree of social segregation were not carried out. Most models that demonstrate the existence of a consecutive central equilibrium use super additive and cooperative games. (Greenber and Weber, 1986; Demange, 1982 and 1994). However, this type of model has two flaws. First, although they demonstrate the existence of a consecutive equilibrium, they do not analyze the effect of inequality on the size of coalitions..